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Abstract—We consider the problem of aligning a pair of
databases with correlated entries. We introduce a new measure
of correlation in a joint distribution that we call cycle mutual
information. This measure has operational significance: it de-
termines whether exact recovery of the correspondence between
database entries is possible for any algorithm. Additionally, there
is an efficient algorithm for database alignment that achieves this
information theoretic threshold.
I. THE DATABASE DEANONYMIZATION PROBLEM
Suppose that we have two databases. Each item in the
databases contain information about a single individual. Some
individuals appear in both databases. When a entry in the
first database and an entry in the second database concern
the same individual, their contents are correlated. The entries
may be two noisy observations of the same signal, they may
be two completely different types of data that have some
correlation through population statistics, or they may even
be correlated though the sampling process used to determine
which individuals appear in the database.
We consider the following question: If the databases are
published with user identities removed from each entry, is it
possible to learn the association between database entries that
correspond to the same individual by exploiting the correlation
between them?
Clearly, when there is enough correlation between entries
about the same individual and the databases are small enough,
it is possible to learn the true alignment between the database
entries. Our goal is to find the precise conditions under which
it is possible to learn the complete correspondence between
entries with high probability. In particular, we would like
to determine the measure of correlation that characterizes
feasibility of perfect deanonymization in this setting.
This framework for database alignment is related to several
practical deanonymization attacks. Narayanan and Shmatikov
linked an anonymized dataset of film ratings to a publicly
available dataset using correlations between the ratings [1].
Differential privacy has been widely used to quantifying
privacy issues related to databases [2]. More recently, gen-
erative adversarial privacy has been proposed [3]. In both
cases, if users are present in multiple databases, knowledge
of alignment is required to fully apply these frameworks.
Takbiri, Houmansadr, Goeckel, and Pishro-Nik have re-
cently investigated a closely related user privacy problem [4].
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Fig. 1. Two databases, Fa and Fb, with alphabets Xa = Xb = {0, 1}
4 and
a matching M between their user identifier sets.
A. Notation
For finite sets X and Y , let RX×Y be the set of real-valued
matrices with rows indexed by X and columns indexed by Y .
For x ∈ RX×Y , let x⊙k ∈ RX×Y be the entry-wise power
of x, i.e. the matrix such that (x⊙k)i,j = (xi,j)
k. Let x⊗k ∈
R
X k×Yk be the tensor power of x, i.e. the matrix such that
for a ∈ X k and b ∈ Yk , (x⊗k)a,b =
∏k−1
i=0 xai,bi .
Let P(X ) be the set of probability distributions on X .
B. Formal description
We have the following sets related to the user identifiers:
Ua Set of user identifiers in the first database
Ub Set of user identifiers in the second database
M ⊆ Ua × Ub Bijective matching between the two types
of user identifierss
A bijection between Ua and Ub is a subset of Ua×Ub in which
each element of Ua and Ub appears exactly once. The matching
M contains the pairs of ids that correspond to the same user.
The fact that M is a bijection implies that |M | = |Ua| = |Ub|.
Throughout, we let n = |M |.
We have the following sets, functions, and distributions
associated with the databases:
Xa Alphabet of entries in first database
Xb Alphabet of entries in second database
Fa : Ua → Xa First database
Fb : Ub → Xb Second database
F = (Fa, Fb)
p ∈ P(Xa ×Xb) Joint distribution between related entries
pa ∈ P(Xa) Marginal distribution on first alphabet
pb ∈ P(Xb) Marginal distribution on second alphabet
Figure 1 illustrates a pair of databases.
C. Generative model
For each user u ∈ Ua, there is a database entry Fa(u) ∈
Xa. For a pair (u, v) ∈ M , the entries Fa(u) and Fb(v) are
correlated via the joint distribution p:
Pr[Fa(u) = i, Fb(v) = j|M ] = p(i, j).
For distinct u, v ∈ Ua, Fa(u) and Fa(v) are independent.
The same is true for distinct u, v ∈ Ub. Thus we define
r(fa, fb;m) =
∏
(u,v)∈m
p(fa(u), fb(v))
so the joint distribution of the databases is
Pr[Fa = fa, Fb = fb|M = m] = r(fa, fb;m). (1)
D. Relationship to graph alignment
The methods used in this paper are related to those used
to analyze information theoretic thresholds for exact graph
alignment [5]–[7]. An undirected graph G can be represented
by its edge indicator function:
(
V (G)
2
) → {0, 1}, so we have
a very simple type of information about each user pair. The
analogue to the generative model (1) is the correlated Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi distribution on graph pairs, where corresponding edge
indicator r.v.s are sampled i.i.d. from some joint distribution
on {0, 1}2. Once the marginal distributions are fixed, the one
remaining degree of freedom specifies the level of correlation.
In the database problem, we instead have larger blocks
of information about individual users. This allows for more
complicated forms of correlations. In this paper, we identify
the relevant one-dimensional summary of that correlation.
A further connection is that graph alignment falls into the
database alignment framework when seed vertices are used [8],
[9]: the list of adjacent seeds is essentially a database entry.
II. RESULTS
Both our achievability and converse bounds use the follow-
ing measure of correlation in a joint distribution. We propose
to call this quantity cycle mutual information.
Definition 1. For p ∈ P(Xa × Xb), let z ∈ RXa×Xb be the
matrix such that zi,j =
√
p(i, j) for i ∈ Xa and j ∈ Xb. For
an integer ℓ ≥ 2, define the order-ℓ cycle mutual information
I◦ℓ (p) =
1
1− ℓ log tr((zz
T )ℓ).
Then z has a singular value decomposition z = UΣV T
where Σ = diag(σ). Observe that
tr(Σ2) = tr(UΣV TV ΣUT ) = tr(zzT ) =
∑
i,j
z2i,j = 1, (2)
so σ⊙2, the vector of squared singular values, constitutes a
probability distribution. Thus we have another expression for
cycle mutual information of order ℓ: I◦ℓ (p) = Hℓ(σ
⊙2), where
Hℓ is the Re´nyi entropy of order ℓ. This expression allows us
to extend the definition of I◦ℓ (p) to all nonnegative real ℓ.
Our achievability theorem allows for arbitrary structure in
the joint distribution of database entries.
Theorem 1. Let M ⊆ Ua ×Ub be a uniformly random bijec-
tion. Let the alphabets Xa and Xa and the joint distribution
p ∈ P(Xa ×Xb) depend on n. If
I◦2 (p) ≥ 2 logn+ ω(1),
there is an estimator for M given F that is correct with
probability 1− o(1).
When the database entries are vectors of independent iden-
tically distributed components, we have a converse bound with
a leading term that matches the achievability.
Theorem 2. Let M ⊆ Ua × Ub be a uniformly random
bijection. Fix alphabets Ya and Yb and a joint distribution
q ∈ P(Ya ×Yb). Let Xa = Yℓa, Xb = Yℓb , and p = q⊗ℓ, where
ℓ can depend on n. If
I◦2 (p) ≤ (2 − Ω(1)) logn,
any estimator for M given F is correct with probability o(1).
III. MAP ESTIMATION
The optimal estimator for M given F is the maximum a
posteriori estimator:
mˆ(fa, fb) = argmax
m
Pr[M = m|F = (fa, fb)]
= argmax
m
Pr[F = (fa, fb)|M = m] Pr[M = m]
Pr[F = (fa, fb)]
(a)
= argmax
m
Pr[F = (fa, fb)|M = m].
In (a) we use that fact that M is uniformly distributed.
Define the event
Em2,m1 = {(fa, fb) : r(fa, fb;m2) ≥ r(fa, fb;m1)}.
When m1 is the true matching, this is the error event in which
m2 is incorrectly preferred to m1.
A. Algorithm for computing the MAP estimator
Define the matrix Q(fa, fb) ∈ RXa×Xb ,
Q(fa, fb)u,v = log p(fa(u), fb(v)).
The MAP estimator is the max weight matching in Q(fa, fb):
mˆ(fa, fb) = argmax
m
∑
(u,v)∈m
Q(fa, fb)u,v.
Thus mˆ can be computed in O(n3) time [10].
IV. GENERATING FUNCTIONS
Let x and y be two matrices of formal variables indexed
by Xa ×Xb, and let xa and ya be vectors of formal variables
indexed by Xa, and let xb and yb be vectors of formal variables
indexed by Xb. For a matching m ∈ Ua × Ub and a pair
of databases fa : Ua → Xa and fb : Ub → Xb, define the
generating function of the joint type
t(m; fa, fb;x) =
∏
(u,v)∈m
xfa(u),fb(v).
Observe that t(m; fa, fb; p) = r(fa, fb;m).
For a pair of matchings, define the generating function
Bm1,m2(x, y) =
∑
fa:Ua→Xa
∑
fb:Ub→Xb
t(m1; fa, fb;x)t(m2; fa, fb; y).
By understanding the behavior of this generating function, we
can obtains upper bounds on the probability of an estimator
making an error.
Throughout this section, let z ∈ RXa×Xb be a matrix and let
za ∈ RXa and zb ∈ RXb be vectors such that zi,j =
√
p(i, j),
(za)i =
√
pa(i), and (zb)j =
√
pb(j).
Lemma 1. For any two bijections m1,m2 ⊆ Ua × Ub,
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1] ≤ Bm1,m2(z, z)
Proof: For any θ ≥ 0, we have
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1]
= E
[
1
(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
≥ 1
)∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
≤ E
[(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ∣∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
.
Furthermore,
E
[(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ∣∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
=
∑
fa,fb
(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ
r(fa, fb;m1)
=
∑
fa,fb
r(fa, fb;m2)
θr(fa, fb;m1)
1−θ
=
∑
fa,fb
t(m1; fa, fb; p)
θt(m2; fa, fb; p)
1−θ
=
∑
fa,fb
t(m1; fa, fb; p
⊙θ)t(m2; fa, fb; p
⊙(1−θ))
= Bm1,m2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ))
where the matrix and vector exponents with ⊙ are applied
entrywise. Selecting θ = 12 gives the claim.
Define the generating function
b◦ℓ (x, y) = tr((xy
T )ℓ).
Regard m1 as a function Xa → Xb and regard mT2 as a
function Xb → Xa. Then their composition mT2 ◦ m1 is a
permutation of Xa
Lemma 2. Let m1,m2 ⊆ Ua × Ub be bijections. Let t◦ℓ be
the number of cycles of length ℓ in the permutation mT2 ◦m1.
Then t◦1 = |m1 ∩m2|,
∑
ℓ ℓt
◦
ℓ = |Xa|, and
Bm1,m2(x, y) =
∏
ℓ∈N
(b◦ℓ (x, y))
t◦ℓ .
Lemma 3. For z′ ∈ RXa×Xb with nonnegative entries and for
ℓ ≥ 2, b◦ℓ(z′, z′) ≤ b◦2(z′, z′)ℓ/2.
Proof: We have b◦ℓ (z
′, z′) =
∑
k σ
2ℓ
k where σk are the
singular values of z′. By a standard inequality on p-norms,∑
k σ
2ℓ
k ≤
(∑
k σ
4
k
)ℓ/2
.
Lemma 4. Let m1,m2 ⊆ Ua × Ub be bijections and let d =
n− |m1 ∩m2|. Then
Bm1,m2(z, z) ≤ b◦2(z, z)d/2.
Proof: From (2), b◦1(z, z) = 1. Then the claim follows
from Lemmas 2 and 3.
V. ACHIEVABILITY
Proof of Theorem 1: We will use a union bound over all
possible errors.
Pr
[ ⋃
m2 6=m1
Em2,m1
∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
≤
∑
m2 6=m1
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1]
=
n∑
d=2
∑
m2∈Sm1,d
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1]
where Sm,d is the set of matchings that differ from m is
exactly d places. We have
|Sm,d| ≤
(
n
d
)
d! ≤ nd.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, we have
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1] ≤
∏
ℓ
b◦ℓ (z, z)
t◦ℓ
≤
∏
ℓ
(b◦2(z, z)
ℓ/2)t
◦
ℓ
= b◦2(z, z)
d/2.
Thus the overall probability of error is at most
n∑
d=2
ndb◦2(z, z)
d/2.
From the main condition of the theorem, we have
I◦2 (p) ≥ 2 logn+ ω(1)
b◦2(z, z) ≤ exp(−2 logn− ω(1))
= o(n−2),
so for sufficiently large n, nb◦2(z, z)
1/2 < 1 and we have
n∑
d=2
ndb◦2(z, z)
d/2 ≤ n
2b◦2(z, z)
1− nb◦2(z, z)1/2
≤ o(1)
which proves the claim.
VI. CONVERSE
Lemma 5. For any two bijections m1,m2 ⊆ Ua × Ub,
Bm1,m2(x, y) = Bm2,m1(x, y).
Proof: For each ℓ, b◦ℓ (x, y) = b
◦
ℓ(y, x). The permutations
mT2 ◦m1 and mT1 ◦m2 are inverses and thus have the same
cycle decomposition. The claim follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. Fix alphabets Ya and Yb and a joint distribution
q ∈ P(Ya × Yb). Let ℓ depend on n such that ℓ = ω(1).
Let Xa = Yℓa, Xb = Yℓb , p = q⊗ℓ. For any two bijections
m1,m2 ⊆ Ua × Ub such that |m1 ∩m2| = n− 2,
Pr[Em2,m1 |M = m1] ≥ b◦2(z, z)(1+o(1)).
Proof: The function c(θ) = Bm1,m2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ)) is a
conditional moment generating function:
c(θ) = E
[
exp
(
θ log
(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
))∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
.
From Lemma 2, we have
Bm1,m2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ))
= b◦1(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ))n−2b◦2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ))
= b◦2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ)).
because
b◦1(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ)) = tr((p⊙θ)(p⊙(1−θ))T ) =
∑
i,j
pθi,jp
1−θ
i,j = 1.
By Lemma 5
c(θ) = b◦2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ)) = b◦2(p
⊙(1−θ), p⊙θ) = c(1− θ).
Moment generating functions are log-convex, so c(θ) is min-
imized at θ = 12 .
Because p = q⊗ℓ, c(θ) is the product of ℓ identical terms.
Let u = q⊙θ and v = q⊙(1−θ).
b◦2(p
⊙θ, p⊙(1−θ)) = b◦2(u
⊗ℓ, v⊗ℓ)
= tr((u⊗ℓ)(v⊗ℓ)T (u⊗ℓ)(v⊗ℓ)T )
= tr(uvTuvT )ℓ
= b◦2(u, v)
ℓ
= b◦2(q
⊙θ, q⊙(1−θ))ℓ
By Crame´r’s Theorem on the asymptotic tightness of the
Chernoff bound [11]
Pr
[
log
(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)
≥ 0
∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
≥ b◦2(q⊙
1
2 , q⊙
1
2 )ℓ(1−oℓ(1))
= b◦2(p
⊙ 1
2 , p⊙
1
2 )1−o(1).
Because ℓ = ω(1), oℓ(1) and o(1) are equivalent.
Lemma 7. For any three bijections m1,m2,m3 ⊆ Ua × Ub,
Pr[Em2,m1 ∩ Em3,m1 |M = m1] ≤ b◦2(z, z)d/2
where d = n− |m2 ∩m3|.
Proof: For θ ≥ 0 and θ′ ≥ 0,
Pr
[
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
≥ 1 ∧ r(fa, fb;m3)
r(fa, fb;m1)
≥ 1
∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
= E[1(Em3,m1)1(Em2,m1)|M = m1]
≤ E
[(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ (
r(fa, fb;m3)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ′∣∣∣∣∣M = m1
]
=
∑
fa,fb
(
r(fa, fb;m2)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ (
r(fa, fb;m3)
r(fa, fb;m1)
)θ′
r(fa, fb;m1)
=
∑
fa,fb
r(fa, fb;m2)
θr(fa, fb;m3)
θ′r(fa, fb;m1)
1−θ−θ′
Choosing θ = θ′ = 12 , we obtain
E[1(Em3,m1)1(Em2,m1)|M = m1]
≤
∑
fa,fb
r(fa, fb;m2)
1
2 r(fa, fb;m3)
1
2
= Bm2,m3(z, z)
(a)
≤ b◦2(z, z)d/2
where (a) follows from Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let m1 be the matching used
to generate the databases and let S = Sm1,2 be the set of
matchings of size n that differ from m1 in exactly two places.
That is, for all m ∈ S, |m1 ∩ m| = n − 2. Observe that
|S| = (n2), because each element of S can be specified by the
two users in Ua that it matches differently than m1 does. Let
X be the number of error events that occur:
X =
∑
m∈S
1(Em,m1).
Let ǫ1 = Pr[Em,m1 |M = m1], i.e. the probability that a
specific transposition error occurs.
We need a lower bound on the probability that X > 0. From
Chebyshev’s inequality, we have
Pr
[
(X−E[X ])2 ≥ E[X ]2
]
≤ E
[
(X − E[X ])2
E[X ]2
]
=
E[X2]
E[X ]2
−1
and we need to find conditions that make this o(1). We have
X2 =
∑
(m2,m3)∈S2
1(Em2,m1)1(Em3,m1)
=
∑
m2∈S
1(Em2,m1) + 2
∑
{m2,m3}∈(S2)
1(Em2,m1)1(Em3,m1)
For a set {m2,m3} ∈
(
S
2
)
, either |m2 ∩m3| = n − 3 or
|m2∩m3| = n−4. There are 3
(
n
3
)
pairs of the former type and
3
(
n
4
)
pairs of the latter type. In the latter case, the indicator
variables Em2,m1 and Em3,m1 are independent. In the former
case, let ǫ2 = Pr[Em2,m1 ∩ Em3,m1 |M = m1].
Now we compute
E[X ]2 =
(
n
2
)2
ǫ21 =
((
n
2
)
+ 6
(
n
3
)
+ 6
(
n
4
))
ǫ21
and
E[X2] =
(
n
2
)
ǫ1 + 6
(
n
3
)
ǫ2 + 6
(
n
4
)
ǫ21
E[X2]− E[X ]2
E[X ]2
=
(
n
2
)
(ǫ1 − ǫ21) + 6
(
n
3
)
(ǫ2 − ǫ21)(
n
2
)2
ǫ21
≤ O
(
1
n2ǫ1
+
ǫ2
nǫ21
)
.
From Lemma 7 we have ǫ2 ≤ (b◦2(z, z))
3
2 and from Lemma 6
we have ǫ1 ≥ (b◦2(z, z))1+o(1), so
Pr[X = 0] ≤ O
(
1
n2(b◦2(z, z))
1+o(1)
+
1
n(b◦2(z, z))
1
2
+o(1)
)
.
If b◦2(z, z) ≥ n−2+Ω(1), then
n2b◦2(z, z)
1+o(1) ≥ n2+(1+o(1))(−2+Ω(1)) ≥ nΩ(1) ≥ ω(1)
and Pr[X = 0] ≤ o(1).
VII. PROPERTIES OF CYCLE MUTUAL INFORMATION
Consider a joint distribution p ∈ P(Xa × Xb) and recall
the definitions of z and σ from Section II. The properties of
σ⊙2 reflect the correlation in the distribution p. The following
three conditions are equivalent: σ⊙2 is supported on one point,
the rank of the matrix z is one, and the p is the product of
distributions on Xa and Xb.
I◦ℓ (p) shares several properties with mutual information. It is
symmetric: I◦ℓ (p) = I
◦
ℓ (p
T ). It tensorizes: I◦ℓ (p
⊗k) = kI◦ℓ (p).
It reduces to entropy in the case of identical random variables:
if Xa = Xb and p = diag(p′), then
I◦ℓ (diag(p
′)) = Hℓ(p
′).
because σ⊙2 is a rearrangement of p′. In general, we have
I◦ℓ (p) ≤ min(Hℓ(pa), Hℓ(pb)).
Something stronger is true: the distribution σ⊙2 majorizes pa
and pb. The diagonal of zz
T is the marginal distributions pa:
(zzT )i,i =
∑
j
z2i,j =
∑
j
pi,j .
Furthermore,
(zzT )i,i = (UΣV
TV ΣUT )i,i =
∑
k
U2i,kσ
2
k.
Because U is an orthogonal matrix, the Hadamard product U⊙
U is doubly stochastic. Thus σ⊙2 majorizes pa. The diagonal
of zT z contains pb, which is also majorized by σ
⊙2.
A. Data processing inequality
Lemma 8. Let p ∈ P(X ), let q ∈ X → P(Y), and let
r ∈ Y → P(Z), so diag(p) ∈ P(X × X ), diag(p)q ∈
P(X × Y), and diag(p)qr ∈ P(X × Z). Then for integer
ℓ ≥ 2, I◦ℓ (diag(p)q) ≥ I◦ℓ (diag(p)qr).
Proof: Define the matrices zi,k =
√
(diag(p)q)i,k and
wi,l =
√
(diag(p)qr)i,l. Then
(zzT )i,i = (ww
T )i,i = pi
We have
(zzT )i,j =
√
pipj
∑
k∈Y
√
qi,kqj,k.
The sum is the Bhattacharyya coefficient of the distribu-
tions qi,· and qj,·, which can be written in terms of the
Bhattacharyya divergence as follows: exp
(
− 12D 12 (qi,·||qj,·)
)
.
Similarly
(wwT )i,j =
√
pipj
∑
l∈Z
√
(qr)i,l(qr)j,l.
By the data processing inequality for Re´nyi divergences
[12], we have
D 1
2
(qi,·||qj,·) ≥ D 1
2
((qr)i,·||(qr)j,·).
Thus
(zzT )i,j ≤ (wwT )i,j
tr((zzT )ℓ) ≤ tr((wwT )ℓ)
I◦ℓ (diag(p)q) ≥ I◦ℓ (diag(p)qr)
for all integer ℓ ≥ 2.
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